‘INC leaders tried to kill me’

Former Iglesia minister: I was illegally detained

Lowell Menorca 2nd, an expelled minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC or Church of Christ) on Sunday claimed that officials of the religious group ordered him killed in July this year.

Menorca, accompanied by his wife Jinky, said he and his family were illegally detained by the INC for three months.

Recounting his ordeal to media, the former minister said he and his family were abducted in Bulan, Sorsogon, and taken to Dasmariñas City in Cavite where two attempts on his life were made.

He said he was handcuffed for 17 hours during the trip from Sorsogon to Cavite.

According to Menorca, he was forced into an empty car and a grenade was tossed inside but it did not explode.

A police officer was then sent to finish him off but Menorca said he pleaded for his life.

“Sabi ko, please don’t kill me. Maawa ka na sa akin. Ang katunayan po ay ministro ako ng Iglesia ni Cristo at may asawa po ako at isang anak [I told him, have mercy on me. I am a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and I have a wife and a child]. I was already crying. Sabi ko I am not a bad person. Huwag niyo naman po sanang hayaan na lumaki ang anak ko na walang ama [I told him please do not allow my child to grow up without a father],’” Menorca said.

He said the policeman took pity on him and agreed not to kill him on condition that criminal charges will be filed against the minister.

“He [police officer] said he will let me live if I can promise that I will agree to whatever charge he will give me in prison, and that I will not make a scandal,” Menorca added.

Charges of illegal possession of firearms were later filed against the minister in a Cavite court.

Menorca, whose petition for a writ of amparo filed in his behalf by his brother was recently granted by the Supreme Court, blamed the INC’s Council of Elders for his torture.

He, however, refused to identify them, saying they will be named when he files criminal charges against them in court.

Menorca said his travails started in July when he was ordered to report to the church’s district office for some incursion while officiating a worship service.

He was then directed to write a statement accusing the estranged sibling of INC executive minister Eduardo Manalo as the person behind several blog posts critical of the INC.

Menorca refused. Several days later, a group of armed men, which included some policemen, accosted him.

“Habang papasok sila at nakita nilang nakita ko na sila ay patakbo silang pumunta sa akin na sumisigaw ng ‘Dapa! Dapa kung ayaw mong masaktan.’ Nakatutok ang lahat ng kanilang baril sa akin [I saw them coming. They were running and they told me to get down if I did not want to be hurt. Their guns were pointed at me],” he said.

From Cavite, Menorca said he and his family were taken to the INC compound in Quezon City where they were detained for three months.

He claimed that they were forbidden to communicate with other people and that he was allowed to go out under heavy guard to deliver statements prepared by church officials to make it appear that all is well.

The former minister said he was suspected to be one of the persons critical of the INC leadership.

“For three months we were there, for three months we were incarcerated. We were never free to go out,’” he told reporters.

Last week, the Supreme Court ordered Manalo to appear before the Court of Appeals (CA) and to bring with him the members of his congregation who were allegedly being held by the church against their will.

The High Court’s order also directed the CA to hear and decide on the petition filed by Anthony Menorca and Jungko Otsuka. Anthony is the brother of Lowell.

A writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security has been violated or threatened.

Trixie Angeles, lawyer for the Menorca camp, said charges of illegal detention will be filed against some officials of the religious group.

source:  Manila Times

SC affirms life term on motorcycle theft

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) and lower court decisions finding a man guilty of carnapping and qualified theft for stealing a motorcycle in Mandaluyong City in 2007.

In a ruling written by Senior Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., the SC’s Third Division dismissed the appeal filed by Julkipli Asamuddin.

The SC upheld the decision of the CA dated May 22, 2014.

Records of the case show that in July 2007, Asamuddin carted away the Honda XRM motorcycle with Plate No. UU-9142 amounting to Php49,000 owned by Emelina Gloria.

The case was elevated to the SC when Asamuddin did not get a favorable decision both from the CA and the Mandaluyong City Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In its Sept. 2, 2015 ruling, the SC said that the RTC and the CA were right when they ruled against Asamuddin.

“The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed in the criminal case for carnapping the penalty of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, which is within the range of the imposable penalty under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539[,]” the SC said.

The SC said that “the appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for Qualified Theft in [a separate case.]”

“The penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher under Article 31062 of the Revised Penal Code, thus appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. However, appellant is disqualified under R.A. No. 9346 in relation to Resolution No. 24-4-1064 to avail the benefits of parole.”

Concurring with the ruling were Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza. PNA

source:  Manila Times

Prescription of crimes

Dear PAO, 
In 2006, the owner of the house I am renting, with the help of other persons, forcibly entered our home and took my antique cabinets. What happened is that they lured my wife out of the house and forcibly entered our house through the rear door. Then, they refused to let us in and began piling our belongings outside on the street. However, the antique cabinets were kept as payment for our back rentals. Can we still file a case against them though the incident happened in 2006?        
Sonica5

Dear Sonica5,
Before answering your question concerning prescription of crimes, it is crucial to establish first what crime was actually committed.

Based on your narration, the acts of the owner of the house and his aides would constitute theft. There is theft when a person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons or force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent (Art. 308, Revised Penal Code [RPC]). The elements of the crime of theft are: 1) taking of personal property; 2) the property belongs to another; 3) done with intent to gain; 4) done without consent of the owner; and 5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon things (People vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598).

Applying the foregoing to your case, it is clear that the first four elements are present. The owner of the house and his aides took the antique cabinets you own with intent to gain, that is, to apply it to the unpaid rents, and that the same was executed without your consent. As to the last element referring to violence, intimidation and force, your narration is devoid of any allegation of violence or intimidation employed by the owner of the house and his aides against you and your wife to secure possession of the antique cabinets. Hence, we assume that there is none. Moreover, though you mention a forcible entry, none of the instances mentioned in Article 299 of the RPC, constituting force upon things such as breaking of door, using false keys or pretending the exercise of public authority to enter your house is apparent from your narration. The lack of allegation on these matters leads us to conclude that there is no violence, intimidation of persons, or force upon things present in your case, satisfying the final element of the crime of theft.

This is not to say that forcible entry into a house is not punishable by law. The forcible entry into your house could be separately considered as trespass to dwelling. Trespass to dwelling is committed by any person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will. (Art. 280, Id.) Under this law, the offender may be prosecuted so long as the entry is prohibited by the owner, expressly or impliedly, even though no violence was employed. The entry of the owner of the house and his aides into your house which you categorize as forcible creates an impression to us that the entry was effected against your will and thus we consider the crime of trespass to dwelling.

Going to your query on prescription of crimes, Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code sets the period of prescription of crimes or the period allowed to institute a case which is not uniform for all crimes. It ranges from two months to 20 years depending on the classification of the imposable penalty. In general, the higher the penalty, the longer the prescription period.

Theft is penalized according to the value of personal property taken and the penalty that can be imposed on the offender ranges from aresto menor in its minimum period to reclusion temporal. Thus, depending on the value of personal property taken, the crime of theft prescribes in two months or up to 20 years (Article 309 in relation to Sections 25 & 90, Id.) As there is no allegation as to the value of the antique cabinets taken, the period of prescription cannot be ascertained. Assuming, however, that the value of the antique cabinets taken were more than P12,000, then you at least have 15 years to file the case.

As to the trespassing case, we regret to inform you that the case may no longer be filed. Simple trespass to dwelling is punishable by aresto mayor which prescribes in five years. (Article 280 in relation to Sections 25 & 90, Id.) Considering that the crime occurred in 2006 or around nine years ago, your right to file the case has already prescribed.

Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely based on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. The opinion may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.

We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.

Editor’s note: Dear PAO is a daily column of the Public Attorney’s Office. Questions for Chief Acosta may be sent to dearpao@manilatimes.net

Applications for probation not automatically granted

Dear PAO,
Are applications for probation of an accused who was sentenced to an imprisonment automatically granted by the court? If granted, how long will the offender be placed on probation?
Nadia

Dear Nadia,
Probation is defined as a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer (Section 3(A), Presidential Decree (PD) 968). By probation, a qualified offender will not serve his sentence in jail, but will only be subjected to a community-based rehabilitation or reformation program.

Not all applications for probation, however, are automatically granted by the court. In determining whether an applicant may be granted probation, the court takes into consideration all the information relative to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender and available institutional and community resources. It shall deny the application for probation of a convicted offender if it finds that: 1) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; 2) there is an undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or 3) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed (Section 8, PD 968).

In addition, the benefit of probation shall also not be granted to the following disqualified offenders: 1) those who have been sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; 2) those who are convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public order; 3) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos; 4) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this decree; and 5) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof (Section 9, Ibid.)

Regarding your second question, the period within which a person may be placed on probation shall depend on the term of imprisonment handed by the court. The period of probation for those who are sentenced to imprisonment of not more than one (1) year shall not exceed two (2) years and, in all other cases, the period shall not exceed six (6) years (Section 14, Id.)

We hope that we were able to answer your queries. Please be reminded that this advice is based solely on the facts that you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. Our opinion may vary when other facts are changed or elaborated.

Editor’s note: Dear PAO is a daily column of the Public Attorney’s Office. Questions for Chief Acosta may be sent to dearpao@manilatimes.net

Protesters who attack policemen face assault raps

Dear PAO, 
I am a police officer detailed somewhere in Metro Manila. One day, together with five other police officers, I was assigned to secure a certain private parking area that has been a frequent venue for rallies and protests without the necessary permits. We were ordered to maintain peace and order in the area, and in the event of a rally, maintain maximum tolerance.

In one instance, a group of around 10 people gathered at the entrance of the parking lot and insisted to enter. My fellow police officers and I calmly asked if they had a permit to use the parking lot for a protest rally, but they could not show any permit. They began being agitated and started to shout foul words at us, and began throwing materials at us such as their banners, rocks, even monobloc chairs.

Bystanders merely walked past us, but some offered help and were trying to pacify the unruly group. The scuffle ended with four of us police officers hurt. I would just like to know if we, police officers, can file any criminal case against them. If so, what particular case? 
PO2 Ramon

Dear PO2 Ramon,
Although the 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of expression to all persons, it is not an absolute right. Protest rallies may be done in designated freedom parks; otherwise, there is a need for a permit from the local government unit having jurisdiction over the place where the intended rally is to be held. In your case, the protesters did not have a permit and they were attempting to hold a protest rally in a private parking area. Therefore, you and your police officer companions had the duty to ensure and maintain peace and order. You were correct in standing your ground and exercising maximum tolerance.

As for the scuffle that ensued, the persons who threw things at you and the other police officers while engaged in the lawful performance of your duties could be charged with Direct Assault under Art 148 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of which read:

“Any person or persons who, without a public uprising xxx xxx shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance xxx”

Under this provision of the RPC, those persons are liable for attacking you and the other police officers who were in the lawful performance of your official duties. As law enforcers, you and your companions are considered persons in authority. Hence, throwing things such as banners, rocks, monobloc chairs at police officers is clearly an attack on a person in authority.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the incident happened during a public apprising; and thus, exempting the persons from the crime of Direct Assault. It would then be up to the courts and the evidence presented whether or not there was a public apprising at that time that would exempt those involved from the crime of Direct Assault.

Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely based on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. The opinion may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.

We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.

Editor’s note: Dear PAO is a daily column of the Public Attorney’s Office. Questions for Chief Acosta may be sent to dearpao@manilatimes.net

After granting bail to Enrile, will Supreme Court do the same for Arroyo?

The Supreme Court has final authority on questions of law, including the Constitution. In the legal community, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement is law. And the gods of Padre Faura have spoken.

Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin declared that “Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.” The Supreme Court ruled, therefore, that the fragile state of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile’s health presented a compelling justification for his admission to bail.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen vented in his dissenting opinion that the granting of bail to Sen. Enrile for humanitarian reason set a dangerous precedent.

The decision “will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion,” wrote the most junior member of the Court.

Every court, including the Supreme Court itself, is now bound by that precedent. Bail will be granted if the poor health of the petitioner justifies it, even if not presented by the accused as the basis of his plea for provisional liberty. Sen. Enrile did not present his feeble health as argument for his release from detention.

However, those who expect human rights lawyers to swamp the courts with petition for bail for the hundreds of enfeebled septuagenarian and octogenarian languishing in penal colonies and city jails on the basis of the new law would be terribly disappointed. Justice Leonen said that the decision was ‘especially tailored’ for Enrile. I say it was “coutouriered” exclusively for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Take note of what Associate Justice Bersamin, who penned the decision, said of Sen. Enrile, “With his solid reputation in his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.” Only former president Gloria Arroyo among the many ailing lolos andlolas in prisons can be described similarly.

Sen. Enrile was confined for a year in a general hospital because his fragile health required continuous medical attention and care.

With the death of Andal S. Ampatuan, Sr. only Mrs. Arroyo, who has remained in custody in the Veterans Memorial Medical Center since December 2013, among the many aged and ill prisoners, is situated similarly.

Sometime in October 2010, retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban wrote in his Philippine Daily Inquirer column: “The sociological school of legal philosophy holds that to predict how case would be decided (by the Supreme Court), one must consider the personality of the magistrate and the various stimuli attendant to a case per this formula: personality times stimuli equals decision (P x S = D). The personality of a magistrate includes intrinsic qualities like upbringing, education, relationships, etc. Stimuli refer to how he/she responds to externals like public opinion, peer pressure, religious leaders, medical condition, appointing authority, appointment sponsor, close friends, etc.”

That observation strongly suggested that justices of the Supreme Court sometimes decide not only on the basis of an objective interpretation of the law and the established facts but on personal considerations as well. The suggestion led me to believe that some of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court under former chief justice Renato C. Corona were prompted by personal considerations.

Renato Corona would not have been chosen Chief Justice of the Supreme Court if a provision of the Constitution had been observed. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the President from making any appointment two months before the presidential election up to the end of his/her term. The presidential election was held on May 10, 2010 and Pres. Arroyo’s term was to end on June 30, 2010.

President-elect Benigno S. C. Aquino III had made known he was not going to replace retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno with Mr. Corona. So, Pres. Arroyo appointed Mr. Corona, her former chief of staff, Chief Justice on May 12, 2010, in violation of the Constitution as the appointment was made within the prohibition period.

The same associate justices set aside the Constitution so that Diosdado Ignacio “Dado” M. Arroyo, son of Mrs. Arroyo, can have a district to represent. The representative of the old 2nd District of Camarines Sur before Mr. Arroyo wanted to be back in Congress as the district’s representative. The Arroyo-subservient Congress broke up the district into two, one for Mr. Arroyo and the other for the former representative, Rolando G. Andaya, Jr.

That act of Congress was questioned before the Supreme Court as there would be disproportionate representation of Camarines Sur in Congress in contravention of the provision of the Constitution on equal representation. However, the Court upheld Congress. So, the district formerly represented in Congress by one congressman is now represented by two whereas the two larger districts are represented by only one each.

The older brother of Dado, Juan Miguel “Mikey” M. Arroyo, also had to have a seat in Congress, his old seat having been taken by his mother. The sycophants of Mrs. Arroyo in the Commission on Elections allowed him to represent Ang Galing Pinoy, the party-list of tricycle drivers and security guards, in Congress. Some groups questioned before the Court the eligibility of millionaire Mr. Mikey Arroyo to represent tricycle drivers and security guards. The Court quickly dismissed the disqualification complaint, saying that the case was outside its jurisdiction.

But the same Corona Court moved swiftly to stop impeachment proceedings against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez following her petition for certiorari and prohibition, when impeachment is well within the province of the House of Representatives.

In 2011, Mrs. Arroyo, who had been charged with electoral fraud, was under a hold departure order (HDO).

On Nov. 15 of the same year, the Corona Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the HDO. Those who voted in favor of the issuance of the TRO were Chief Justice Corona, Associate Justices Bersamin, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Jose P. Perez, Martin S. Villarama Jr., and. Roberto A. Abad, all appointees of Mrs. Arroyo to the Supreme Court. Mr. Abad retired last year.

According to some nonpartisan lawyers, Chief Justice Corona should have called an en banc session to hear the oral arguments against the TRO before issuing it and making it immediately executory. The undue and unusual haste with which the TRO was issued raised the suspicion that the appointees of Mrs. Arroyo to the Supreme Court were really giving her the chance to flee.

Those who voted in favor of the precedent-setting ruling to grant provisional liberty to the accused for humanitarian reason were Associate Justices Bersamin, Brion, Peralta, Velasco, Perez, and Teresita Leonardo-de Castro (also an appointee of Mrs. Arroyo). Associate Justice Villarama was on leave.

In our democratic system of government the enactment of laws rests with the duly elected representatives of the people, the members of Congress. But eight lawyers unelected by the people have in effect enacted a new law seemingly to benefit a person, Mrs. Arroyo, to whom they are all beholden.

Oscar P. Lagman, Jr. is a member of Manindigan!, a cause-oriented group that takes stands on national issues.

oplagman@yahoo.com

source:  Businessworld

Enrile seeks fair trial on plunder case, requests for bill of particulars

MANILA – Seeking due process in the plunder case against him, detained Senator Juan Ponce Enrile petitioned the Supreme Court to furnish him a bill of particulars on the plunder and graft charges filed against him.

“The denial by the Sandiganbayan of petitioner Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars is… not a mere denial of a procedural right granted an accused under the Rules of Court but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to assure fairness of the trial of the offense charged. For, indeed, only when the trial is fair can there be a judgment that is just,” Enrile’s petition read, mentioning that he earlier asked the Sandiganbayan for a bill of particulars but was denied.

The detained senator was referring to Section 9, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court which stated that ‘the accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial.’

In law, a bill of particulars is a ‘detailed, formal and written statement of charges or claims given upon a formal request to the court for more detailed information.’

Last year, Enrile was charged of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly using his P172.8 million Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to fund multi-billion pork barrel scam mastermind Janet Lim-Napoles’ bogus foundations and nongovernment organizations’ ghost projects and programs in exchange of commissions.

Enrile then asked the Supreme Court for a bill of particulars on his purported misuse of the PDAF which was originally intended to be used for projects and programs that would alleviate poverty in the Philippines.

The High Court yesterday granted Enrile’s plea and ‘directed the Office of the Ombudsman to submit a Bill of Particulars, providing the information to be contained in the Court’s judgment.’

With the Court granting his petition, the senator then sought for clarifications in the following questions:

Who among the accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth worth P172 million;

What are the particular overt acts they have committed to constitute the ‘combination’;

What are the particular overt acts which constitute the ‘series’;

What was ‘repeatedly’ received;

What is the basis in describing the said projects as fictitious; and

How did Enrile take advantage of his position and why?

source:  

Philippine Canadian Inquirer on August 12, 2015

Gigi Reyes may be held principally liable in Enrile’s plunder case

MANILA – Senator Juan Ponce Enrile’s former chief of staff Jessica Lucila “Gigi” Reyes may be held ‘principally liable’ for his alleged P172-million commissions from P10-billion pork barrel scam mastermind Janet Lim-Napoles’ bogus foundations’ ghost programs and projects.

With Enrile’s request for a bill of particulars, which will be handed over by the Sandiganbayan anytime soon, Reyes could be held responsible for Enrile’s purported misappropriation of his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) allocations.

In law, a bill of particulars is a ‘detailed, formal and written statement of charges or claims given upon a formal request to the court for more detailed information.’

Backstory: Enrile seeks fair trial on plunder case, requests for bill of particulars

Napoles’ scam whistle-blowers’ former lawyer Levito Baligod said in a Philippine Daily Inquirer report that if Reyes would not speak soon, she may be presumed as the ‘ultimate recipient’ of Enrile’s alleged kickbacks.

“Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars intends to highlight the fact that Reyes will be made principally liable for the plunder case because allegations point to her as the recipient of the kickbacks amounting to plunder level,” Baligod said in the report.

“If Reyes will keep silent on this point, she will be presumed to be the ultimate recipient of the kickbacks, hence the mastermind, and everybody else, including Enrile, maybe considered mere accomplices,” he added.

Moreover, Enrile earlier admitted allowing Reyes to handle his PDAF allocations on his behalf. The 91-year-old senator also denied signing some liquidation documents.

Enrile’s plunder case remained on trial. Senators Jinggoy Estrada and Bong Revilla, who were also linked to the multi-billion pork barrel scam, had pending bail petitions.

source:

Philippine Canadian Inquirer on August 24, 2015